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TRANSMITTAL SLIP | DATE 24 Dec 80

TO: [redacted] A/NIO/EA

RO

REMARKS: Attached is a copy of the latest version of the SEA Talking Points. [redacted] expanded on your 19 December input at our request.

FILE

FRO [redacted]

ROOM NO. [redacted] BUILDING [redacted] EXTENSION [redacted]

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 (47)
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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A/NIO/EA & OSR/RA
23 December 1980

SEA

ap: SEA d ASEAN tates

US influence fairly strong except in Indochina

-- Most ASEAN states (Thai, Malay, Sing, Indo, Phil) would like us to do more

ASEAN cohesive in face of Viet occupation of Kampuchea, but sub-surface differences over long-term threat from China and whether to accomodate Hanoi

-- Malay and Indo in particular worried about local Chinese population which controls commerce, breeds resentment

-- ethnic tensions in each country could cause trouble -- e.g. recent riots in Java

Thai most threatened, concerned about Viet in Kampuchea -- try to maintain buffer through support of Khmer resistance

-- allow DK and other resistance to use border bases

-- funnel Chinese arms and supplies to the DK

-- middleman in getting resistance factions together

DK forces stronger than year ago and mounting more aggressive attacks but cannot hold territory or expel Viets

-- DK have 30-35,000 tough, disciplined troops

-- DK fight mostly in 10-20 man teams but beginning some larger operations

-- DK well armed for guerrilla operations but totally dependent on Thai connection

-- DK can fight on for long time but face recruiting problems -- most Khmer hate Pol Pot (also dislike Viets)

-- Little cooperation among resistance; Son Sann most important but not viable military alternative to DK

: VN ed rces

Viets have some 200,000 troops (20 divs) in Kampuchea with large concentration along Thai border

-- Viets control most of country but can't eliminate DK

-- Viets not overly aggressive and friction in ranks

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Puppet government of Heng Samrin counts for little -- no real authority and relies on Viets for administration and fighting

-- Possibility of mass starvation always just around corner

-- Large refugee influx could cause trouble in Thai

-- US deeply involved in relief effort from Thai

Rest of ASEAN also troubled by immediate Viet threat

-- Makes for common concern with Chinese

Beijing, in addition to supplying DK with arms, keeps up pressure on common Sino-Vietnam border

Top: VN Ground Forces Near China

-- Viets keep nearly 300,000 troops (best forces) on Chinese border, actually outnumber Chinese troops in border area

-- Chinese can reinforce quickly, Viets pushing manpower limits

Chinese hope long-term pressures (bleeding VN) will make Viets more tractable, less willing to lean on Soviets

-- China gambling on strong Viet nationalism

-- In short run has worked other way around

Soviets more deeply entrenched in Vietnam as result of Chinese threat and increased military assistance

-- Soviets have delivered $1 billion in arms each of past two years

Photo: Su-22 Further Delivery

-- Advanced SU-22 and MIG-21 fighters, ASW and gunship helos, cruise missiles, frigates, missile boats, SAMs, tanks, APCs

-- Soviet weaponry enabled Viets to double military & modernize

Soviet presence and use of Viet military facilities increased greatly over past two years

-- Soviets have some 5-6,000 advisors in Vietnam

-- Largest Soviet presence at Danang and Cam Rang Bay

-- Danang is port thru which most Soviet arms arrive, are assembled and tested by Soviets

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Photos: Soviet DF site + Soviet Recce Acft

-- Cam Ranh has Soviet intelligence site, comsat facility, onshore naval support, and used for Bear recce missions

Photo: Minsk

-- Some 10 Soviet naval ships in port or Viet waters, Minsk called at Cam Ranh in September and stayed in Viet waters for two months

Photo: Transporter and Krivak later went to Kampuchea)

-- Soviet repair ship and transporter-drydock arrived Cam Ranh in November

-- Minsk operated off Kampuchea & Thai in Nov and Krivak called recently at Kompong Som

-- Soviets using a dozen transports to provide Viets with airlift throughout Indochina

Soviets also propping up Hanoi with large quantities of economic aid

-- Soviet economic aid totals $800 million per year for past two years but may be declining

-- Hanoi in dire economic straits and could not survive without continued massive Soviet aid

Not many choices open to Chinese to change all this

-- "Second lesson" would be bloody and with Viet buildup, success problematic

-- Beijing would attack if credibility in doubt or it Thai under heavy attack

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Southeast Asia



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Vietnamese Armed Forces



Army		**800,000**
Divisions	70	
Kampuchea	20	
Laos	5	
Vietnam	45	
Navy		**5,000**
Major Combatants	15	
Others	630	
Air Force		**25,000**
Fighters	250	
Fighter-Bombers	70	
Total armed forces personnel		**830,000**

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Vietnamese Ground Forces near the Chinese Border



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